In Search of a New Agenda for Isreli-Arab Peace

reprinted from San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1991

by Jay Rothman

Where war and enmity have ruled, peace must be gradually constructed on foundations carefully laid. The Israeli-Arab conflict is such a case.
Which peace plan is implemented and what international forum is eventually employed are less important than whether the parties can find the will and method to work together to design and implement mutually acceptable solutions.
As he tries to build foundations for an effective peace process, Secretary of State James Baker should use his diplomatic skills to help foster such a will. In this context, negotiations can follow a lengthy pre-negotiation process of narrowing differences, building agreements and finding areas of common concern and cooperation.
Three concepts lie behind most plans and procedures for negotiations between Israelis and Arabs. These are: scarcity of territory and power, historical enmity and zero-sum conditions, where one side's gain is at the other's expense.
The problems so summarized set a negotiating agenda. To address scarcity, it is proposed parties reach "historical compromises" based on "land for peace." To overcome enmity, a third party, the U.S. or possibly the Soviet Union, must persuade, reassure and pressure parties to promise enforcement of compromises attained. For zero-sum conditions, parties must get used to the idea that compromises are necessary.
But while these summarize the conflict's important characteristics, they have been overemphasized to the neglect of other agenda items that possibly should precede.
The conflict, particularly when reduced to its national core-Israelis against Pales-tinians-is also about the development and expression of nationalism and communal identity, dignity, safety, and control.
Thus "national interests" are not the core. Instead, focusing on communal concerns that motivate Israelis and Arabs in their struggle against each other may lead to a new negotiating agenda. Such a redefinition also suggests a new role for the U.S.: from forceful, third party to supportive facilitator.
Reordering of priorities does not imply negotiation is not about achieving painful compromises-such as land for peace, but that compromises might best come at the end of a process of narrowing differences and building spheres of self-interested cooperation.
United Nations' resolutions 242 and 348 appear to provide solid foundations for peace. However, they have not yet proved useful. Wishful thinking that often prevails in U.S. administration efforts to get talks going, that a "peace process" could build a life of its own, is grounded in such logical, but impotent declarations as "land for peace," and a "just solution for all peoples."
This certainly turns common wisdom about negotiation on its head. Parties are expected to arrive at the table seeking to gain the most and sacrifice the least. However, experiences such as the Camp David accords have demonstrated that preparation for negotiation can create spheres of agreement prior to reaching the table.
In searching for a new agenda, the U.S. should help parties go beyond unabridge-able positions by dissecting them. Shamir wants to initiate negotiations to gain acceptance in the Arab world, avert Palestinians' desire for statehood and build an alternative leadership to the PLO. The PLO wants negotiations to lead to a Palestinian state.
Such agenda items bear no bridging. However, if opening positions are dissected, starting points are possible with intermediate agreements that concern spheres of cooperation-such as designing ways to address water shortages, economic inter-dependence and common security.